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Suppose things are very bad, so bad that some of us need to die: there simply are not 
enough resources for everyone to live. Being the sort of beings we are, moral but 
imperfectly so, we have tried to keep everyone on board, but have finally been forced to 
conclude that it is the way to all-around starvation. Our options are few. Either we will 
all die trying to keep everyone alive, or we somehow select some who will make the 
ultimate sacrifice for others. Clearly the latter route is the lesser of two evils. But how to 
select? We could let things run their course and allow the weak to perish in the war of 
all against all, which is sure to come when all that is left are the seeds for next year’s 
meagre crop. This would not only be morally intolerable, but also irrational, for the best 
Hobbesian reasons – we all need to sleep sometimes, and no one can be sure of survival.  
So instead, we should, both morally and rationally, hold a lottery that gives 
everyone an equal chance to survive. The elements of any lottery are the lots, the 
objects by means of which chances are distributed, a randomizing device that designates 
some lots as winning either before or after the draw, and the designed outcome, the 
distribution of prizes according to distribution of the lots designated as winning or 
losing. The actual outcome of the lottery may diverge from the designed outcome if 
there is cheating or mistakes involved at some stage of the process; this will be 
important. In ordinary lotteries, the lots are tickets, and the designed outcome is that 
those who have a ticket designated as winning receive some money or goods. In the 
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survival case, however, if you draw a winning lot, your prize is living, together with the 
other winners, with enough resources to go on. If you lose, you are to report at the next 
departing ice floe. Provided that everyone has an equal chance, this solution treats 
everyone with equal respect. Importantly, it is also in everyone’s enlightened self-
interest, given that it is the best deal we can expect other rational agents to agree to, and 
certainly far better than getting nasty and brutish. 
Many a moralist agrees with this picture.1 And there certainly is much to be said 
for a lottery in such circumstances. But there is also a serious challenge to it. For what 
happens after people have drawn their tickets? Those who find themselves with a losing 
ticket have nothing to lose, and nothing to gain by abiding by the rules. The 
consequences are predictable: it is a war of all against all after all, the very state of 
affairs that the lottery was designed to avoid. Worse, this is not just empirical 
speculation. It is the rational thing to do if you are one of the losers – even if war gives 
you only a small chance of survival, your expected utility will be higher than it would if 
you comply.2 It may not be the moral thing to do, depending on what the correct 
relationship between morality and rationality is, but part of the argument for the lottery 
in this case is that it is the solution on which rationality and morality converge. Further, 
many philosophers who are entirely unpersuaded by Hobbesian considerations accept 
something like Owen Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism, 
according to which the demands of a moral ideal or theory should be such that it is 
psychologically possible for creatures like us to comply with them (Flanagan 1991: 32). 
Requiring a massive part of the population to quietly agree to self-sacrifice after 
drawing a losing lot, while still having a fighting chance of survival, surely violates this 
                                                 
1 Survival lotteries in general are endorsed by Harris 1975 and, for example, Timmermann 2004. Lifeboat 
lotteries are endorsed by, for example, Broome 1984 and Rakowski 1993. My cases are inspired in 
particular by Mulgan (forthcoming). 
2 Even Hobbes would agree with this. When one’s own life is the cost, no covenant can oblige. 
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constraint. I call this the Compliance Problem for life-and-death lotteries without 
external authority. 
There is, I believe, only one possible solution to the Compliance Problem. Let 
me first illustrate it with an example. (I emphasize that this is only an example of what a 
concrete solution would look like, so I will avoid messy detail as far as I can.) Suppose, 
again, that we are living in a post-apocalyptic world in which all central authority has 
collapsed and crops have failed, so that some of us have to go for anyone to survive. It 
is not wildly unrealistic to assume that there is still one abundant resource: guns, let us 
say Kalashnikov-style assault rifles, and ammo. A Kalashnikov is in many ways an 
ideal personal weapon: extremely reliable, reasonably accurate with a nice rate of fire, 
and easy to use. As conflicts in the developing world have amply demonstrated, just 
about any man, woman, or child can employ it to deadly effect. This makes it the ideal 
lot for a lifeboat-type survival lottery. Here is one reasonably realistic way to organize 
it. Say that there are a hundred of us on an island that supports fifty over the next 
winter, as our best scientists have determined. What we do is load fifty Kalashnikovs 
with live ammunition and another fifty with empty clips, and randomly distribute them 
to a hundred huts or under a hundred trees, or whatever is the most convenient 
arrangement that gives everyone access to exactly one random gun.3 (It is in everyone’s 
interest to come up with some ingenious way to do this fairly.) At the agreed time, 
everyone goes to a hut and picks up a gun, no doubt quickly checking whether is has 
ammunition. If you get bullets, you are a winner. If you get an empty clip, too bad for 
you: you are to depart and perish. Your heart may rebel against your bad luck, but even 
without external authority, that is all you can do, for any one of the winners is, by the 
very fact that she has drawn a winning Kalashnikov, able to mow you down if you try 
                                                 
3 For an additional dose of psychological realism, we might make the units of lottery families rather than 
individuals, but this and related complications are not pertinent to the main point. 
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anything. If there is to be a war of all against all, its outcome will match the designed 
outcome of the fair lottery.  
To be sure, there is a wrinkle here due to the fact that a loser might pretend to be 
a winner to get close enough to pounce. This requires additional arrangements to make 
sure that the identity of winners and losers is known to all. Perhaps winners should fire 
a shot in the air when everyone is around. If your neighbour’s gun does not fire, you 
know what to do. Alternatively, the lots could be clips instead of guns (which could 
themselves be pre-distributed without ammunition to everyone), the losing ones 
modified so that they will not slot in at all. (It happens to be clearly visible whether a 
Kalashnikov clip is in place or not.) This would have the result that everyone would 
wear their status in plain sight. Options are endless, and it is in everyone’s interest when 
arranging the lottery to ensure the signalling issue is taken care of, since otherwise the 
lottery might as well not be held and the war of all against all would loom again. 
The general solution, thus, is to make the lots themselves the means of 
enforcement for the designed outcome. This way, there is a minimal gap between 
conducting the lottery and bringing about the designed outcome: once the lottery has 
been held, its designed outcome is mutually known and automatically enforceable by 
the winners, so that no external authority is needed. To be sure, the gap could in 
principle be eliminated altogether, so that conducting the lottery would automatically 
bring about the designed outcome. For example, available technology permitting, 
everybody could be hooked up to wires at the same time and random fatal electric 
shocks administered to the right amount of people.4 With my choice of weapon, the 
equivalent would be circular firing squads with randomly assigned live bullets. This, 
however, would be to dissolve rather than solve the Compliance Problem, since 
                                                 
4 This was suggested to me by [reference omitted for blind review]. 
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compliance would no longer be an issue, precisely because there is no gap within which 
the losers could choose either to comply or not. The problem with this alternative not 
rational as much as moral: it necessarily involves killing innocent people, while in the 
Kalashnikov-type lottery, nobody actually needs to be killed. Rather, the losers remove 
themselves from the population one way or another, as they have agreed to do ex ante.5 
The guns eliminate the incentive to deviate from the agreement, not the losers 
themselves. Thus, leaving a minimal gap leaves maximal room for free choice, and thus 
amounts to maximal respect for individuals as rational agents under the circumstances. 
As before, it is ex ante rational for everyone to agree to such an arrangement in 
the specified circumstances, but with this method of lottery, it is also ex post rational for 
everyone to abide by the results.6 Granted, in the real world Kalashnikovs or other 
weapons may not be found in the right amount, everyone may not be able to use them 
well enough, somebody’s gun may jam, and so on, but in spite of their practical 
importance, these are relatively trifling issues, philosophically speaking. In principle, 
the solution is clear, and it seems clear that a self-enforcing lottery is the only possible 
solution to the Compliance Problem for survival lotteries with no external enforcement. 
Or is it? 
 
                                                 
5 In most circumstances, removing themselves from the community will leave the losers with a small 
chance of survival. This is one reason why death by bullet need not be the absolutely certain outcome of 
deviating from the agreement: it is enough to ensure rational compliance that death by Kalashnikov is 
more likely than death by the beasts of the jungle. 
6 Indeed, it is more rational for people to agree to the lottery ex ante when they can be confident that its 
designed outcome will be the actual outcome. 
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